Why does Israel not support the JCPOA

Hamas: 14,000 missiles - the role of Iran

The Islamic Republic supports Hamas politically and in building rockets and drones. But that alone does not explain the Israel-Gaza war

The talk of the complicated Middle East is no coincidence. Little is as simple as comments and contributions to the discussion want it to be. For example, there is the question of how it can come about that the legendary Israeli secret services were surprised by the enormous missile arsenal, which is highlighted as a novelty in the current war.

Middle East experts point to the obvious that the Israeli intelligence services knew very well about Hamas' missile capabilities. But the Israeli leadership was apparently surprised by the force of Hamas' response to the events in Jerusalem. In other words, they knew that Hamas was armed for a rocket attack, but the timing was surprising.

Due to the domestic political crisis, the ongoing formation of a government, and problems that exist between Netanyahu and the security apparatus, communication was not as direct and smooth as it should have been. The intelligence briefings had to do with particular difficulties due to the uncertainty about who will have government responsibility in the future.

The great enemy of Iran

The "exit question" also posed particular difficulties: How should the conflict with Hamas be resolved?

There have been no official negotiations between the Israeli government and Hamas in recent years. Under Netanyahu, the issue was pushed aside and postponed until further notice; one relied on Fatah, on old Abbas. And relied on the great enemy image of Iran.

This also provides a major part of the explanation for the military successes of Hamas and its allied Islamist militias. If you look at the analyzes by Seth J. Frantzman, a journalist from Jerusalem Post, who deals with drone wars, or the rocket expert Tal Inbar, they emphasize how much Iran is in the game with the technical and strategic support of Hamas in the current conflict.

Inbar points to similarities in the design of the Hamas rockets with Iranian Shahab rockets and Frantzman points to Hamas's kamikaze drones, which he associates with Iranian drone technology.

"Iran is clever. It will not export its own drones, but the leadership is very clever at packaging the know-how so that the drones can be recreated. Now Hamas was apparently able to copy the designs to theirs to produce its own version in its own country, which dramatically increases your threat to Israel. Make no mistake about it: this is the equivalent of a state sending tanks or planes to a terrorist group. " Seth Frantzman

There are no doubts about the weapons and political support for Hamas from Iran, this is not only addressed in the Israeli media.

The Hamas representative in Tehran, Khaled al-Qaddumi, also reports that Iran has been helping with the production of the rockets for some time. Qaddumi explicitly speaks of the transfer of knowledge, expertise and the help of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the manufacture of rockets, but emphasizes the role of the "engineers of Hamas and other Palestinian groups" in the manufacture of the rockets (see Hamas' advertising clip).

The fact that high-ranking Iranian representatives met with Hamas representatives these days and presented them fraternally in photos should not have surprised anyone and is also a clear signal from the front in times of war.

According to Israeli estimates, the militants in Gaza have around 14,000 rockets in their arsenal. We are still waiting for analyzes as to why the Israeli army was or is not able to effectively prevent the production and firing of many rockets for so long. Hundreds of rocket attacks on Israel were reported daily. Many who aimed at residential areas were successfully intercepted by the Iron Dome, Frantzman reports for the Jerusalem Post.


The current war is causing the different sides to position themselves more sharply. This can also be seen very clearly in the statements made by Turkish President Erdogan against Israeli attacks in the Gaza Strip, which will offend other NATO members and which will fuel the question of how Germany should behave towards Turkish politics.

Erdogan has now also expressed himself on the Jerusalem question in a way that will not calm the tensions between Turkey and Israel. We have known this for many years, but in view of the tensions in the gas dispute in the Mediterranean, in which Israel is also a party, it is currently becoming more explosive.

Escalation and rhetoric

It is a game with fire, the rapid escalation of which is evidenced by the war in the core area of ​​the Middle East conflict, the rhetoric plays no small role. Which is why it is important to pay attention to the role that Iran is assigned. The support of Hamas and other extremist Islamists is one side, the other is to insinuate that Iran instigated Hamas to go to war.

This is contradicted by the interests of Iran, which is interested in lifting the sanctions in the course of the JCPOA negotiations. The fact that Hezbollah has so far behaved rationally enough not to expand the war also does not suggest that Iran is interested in a war.

You have to watch out for differences in times like this. Netanyahu's rhetoric or that of the US think tank FDD, both of which never tire of highlighting Iran's responsibility for armed aggression in the Middle East and looking at it on a monothematic basis, corresponds to a political agenda.

Just like the way the Netanyahu government has dealt with the Palestinians, which has contributed to the present situation, which we hope will soon lead to a ceasefire. But not in a decisive military victory over Hamas. Long-term solutions without negotiations with Hamas are not in sight. Although scientific analyzes speak in favor of negotiations.

But Hamas will not go away either. And Fatah as a solution does not work either as long as an Abbas is illegally in power and can postpone any election. It is a leader with little support from the Palestinian people.

The civilian population pays the bloody, painful and bitter price for the previous policy. (Thomas Pany)

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