Has Japan tried socialism

114 Joel Joos State and Individual in the Japanese Interwar Period: A Brief Sketch of Political Thought by Yoshino Sakuzō Introduction The owl of Minerva does not begin its flight until dusk falls. A Hegel expert like Yoshino Sakuzō - the thinker who had such a profound influence on the political debates in the Japanese academic world between the two world wars - would surely agree. Postwar historians have not hesitated to analyze developments in the preceding period up to the end of the war, some critically, others with greater indulgence.1 Their observations of the Japanese political system in the pre-war period were not the first of their kind Historians had already tried to explain the socio-political field of forces at that time historically, that is, to consider the establishment and changes of alliances and conflicts between the rulers, the opposition, the representatives of the army, the Tennō and his subjects in a historical-scientific way. Obviously, many of the contemporary observers were themselves involved in what was happening; one could therefore accuse them of partiality in their judgment. However, one must not forget that the specific dynamics of the post-war period also ensured that the review of the years up to 1945 was often ideologically colored. One only needs to remember the confrontation between progressive academic circles on the one hand and conservative politicians on the other, or the enemy images of the Cold War. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the political thinking of Yoshino Sakuzō, one of Japan's outstanding intellectuals in the prewar period, has been received ambiguously and often one-sidedly in Japan even today. One topic that we cannot go into here is Yoshino's viewpoints on Asia. They still spark heated discussions. Kamisaka Fuyuko claims to find passages in her essays that justify an invasion of China, 2 1 Cf. Kuno, 1956 2 Cf. Kamisaka, 2006 115 and Ozaki Mamoru claims that Yoshino was reluctant to take an unequivocal position on the Japanese presence in Asia , 3 while Matsumoto Sannosuke - succeeding, inter alia, Matsuo Takayoshi (1998 (1964) - remains convinced that Yoshino was one of the few in that era who dared to condemn the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.4 We want Yoshino was born in Furukawa (now Ōsaki) in Miyagi Prefecture, about 30 kilometers north of Sendai (Sendai is about 300 kilometers north of Tokyo), and he was the oldest Son of a wealthy family and received a solid upbringing while studying in Senda i was baptized by American Baptists (1898). This conversion to the Christian faith at the age of twenty should have a lasting and often dominant influence on his later thinking. Yoshino was an excellent student. He began studying at the law faculty of Japan's most prestigious university, Tokyo Imperial University, where he obtained his degree in 1904 on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War. In Tokyo he came under the influence of Ebina Danjōs, a liberal Christian and founder of "Free Theology" (jiyū shingaku). Until his death, Yoshino would refuse to submit his faith to the authority of an organized church. After continuing his studies, he accepted a position in China in 1906 and was the private tutor of Yuan Shikai's eldest son until 1906. After his return he began to teach political science at his alma mater. He spent a few years in Europe, more precisely in Germany (Heidelberg) and Austria (Vienna), then also in England, France, Belgium and America. In 1914 he became a professor at the law faculty of the same university. The impressions he gained during his stay in various European countries from 1910 to 1913 were important not only with regard to his academic career, but also and above all because Yoshino came into direct contact with the social democratic movement, in short before the tumultuous years of war (during which time many of its members would succumb to the tide of nationalism that inundated the nations of Europe): He was particularly impressed by the way in which the workers' parties and trade unions succeeded in playing an important political role Christian morality was linked in reality with socially acceptable and socially conscious politics. 3 See Ozaki, 2008 4 See Matsumoto, 2008; Matsuo, 1998. 5 Yuan Shikai (1859-1916) was a military leader and politician during the late Qing Dynasty and President of the Republic of China from 1912 to 1916. 116 A respected contributor to Chūō kōron (Central review), a respectable and respected author At this point in time, the magazine, which was moving more and more into the political center, had a great influence on the political-scientific discussions of the time. In particular, the essay on the meaning of the word “democracy” and its specific interpretation in modern Japan, published in 1916, leaves a deep impression. Yoshino's plea for the introduction of "party political", i.e. those founded by political parties rather than inviolable patriarchs, cabinets and for the introduction of universal suffrage is still recognized today as a milestone in democratic thought in Japan. At the end of 1918 he founded the “Society of Dawn” (Reimeikai), a group of “enlightened” young scientists who endeavored to eradicate old-fashioned thinking and to improve the living conditions of the people. With regard to international politics, Yoshino expressed his appreciation for the Versailles Peace Treaty, and especially for the democratic internationalism of the new League of Nations. Within the Reimeikai, however, there was disagreement between a moderate wing and a radical, left-wing wing. The association disappeared inconspicuously in 1920 after police persecution due to ongoing criticism of the government. The second well-known association that Yoshino co-founded was the "Society of the New Man" (Shinjinkai). It was mainly students from the University of Tokyo who took part. Their agenda was strongly socially oriented from the start and from 1921 onwards it was to move more and more towards an activist, socialist point of view. Yoshino maintained a due distance and distanced himself even more clearly when the company de facto merged with the Communist Party of Japan in 1926. In 1924 Yoshino quit his academic position and worked for a short time as a journalist for the Asahi newspaper, after which he resumed teaching on the one hand and on the other hand participated in the establishment of the "Social People's Party" (Shakai minshū tō). In this case, too, his engagement was rather short. Yoshino again refused uncompromising communism. As a result, its influence in the social science circles dominated by Marxism declined rapidly. He devoted himself increasingly to historical research, especially the history of the civil movements of the Meiji period (1868-1912), and once again drew attention with an essay that was critical of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. He died of pleurisy in a sanatorium in 1933. 117 As mentioned above, Yoshino published in the Taishō period (1912–1925) and also in the early years of the Shōwa period from 1926 onwards various essays in which he expressed himself fundamentally on the weaknesses and potentials of the political system in Japan at that time . But the ideas that he put up for discussion in these writings can neither be clearly assigned to the Tennō-critical position of the progressive camp, nor do they fully correspond to the conservative nationalist position with its glorification of the unity of people and ruler and its condemnation of the parliamentary system. These ideas will now be outlined below. The presentation focuses on three fonts. First, the content of an essay is presented that Yoshino published in 1916 in the magazine Chūō kōron under the title “Kensei no hongi o toite sono yūshū no bi o nasu no michi wo ronzu” (an approximate translation could be: “Reflections on essence a policy in the spirit of the constitution and about which path we should take to bring such a policy to a grand conclusion ”). Then it will be shown how Yoshino developed these considerations further, initially on the basis of "Kokka chūshin-shugi to kojin chūshin-shugi - ni shichō no tairitsu - shōtotsu - chōwa", an essay from 1919 whose title is: "State-centered Thinking and individualistic thinking - opposition, dichotomy and synthesis of these two currents of thought ”. This text initially appeared in several parts in the Asahi newspaper in February 1922 and in book form in September of the same year. The presentation is rounded off by the inclusion of "I-aku jōsō ron" (literally: considerations on the ‘direct appeal to the imperial authority‘), an essay from 1923, in the consideration. 6 In it, Yoshino discusses the right to direct appeals (jōsō) to the Tennō, which was granted to all incumbents and members of the two chambers of parliament in the constitution of 1890 (Article 49) but in reality almost exclusively in the context of Article 11 (the supreme command the army belongs to the emperor) - hence the term i'aku, military authority (literally: tent or tent camp). The army has often relied on this article to counter control by civilian authorities, and it was this abuse that was sharply criticized by Yoshino. These essays were chosen from the rich literature of Yoshino for two reasons. On the one hand, they contain basic concepts of his thinking and at the same time belong to the most influential of his oeuvre. On the other hand, a break in Yoshino's political thinking can be seen in them, a transition, so to speak. 6 Mitani 1972, pp.91-205; Yoshino 1946, Vol. 1, 167-225. 118 from early Yoshino to later, which took a less moderate direction and increasingly criticized the political system. An interesting question in this context could be: Were the years between the two world wars "normal" and was the militarism of the 1930s an unfortunate but accidental "derailment" of an essentially healthy system? Or were the roots of militarism and war in Asia-Pacific even in the Meiji constitutional system itself? Why was Japanese democracy unable to prevent the rise of militarism? Was the war - or, more succinctly, for most Japanese: the cataclysmic defeat - the result of an evil that arose in the political, social and spiritual system as it had existed since the upheaval of the Meiji renewal (1868)? 7 Also Yoshino's thinking cannot escape this question or accusation: Were his essays a healthy expression of an early interrupted but deep, anti-authoritarian desire for democracy? Or were they no more than hopeful but marginal flash in the pan that only resonated with intellectuals? The question is indeed of general interest. Attempting to answer this is beyond the scope of this essay, which is limited to an introduction to some of Yoshino's ideas. In this post I take a look at Yoshino's state thinking without going into detail about its political activities. Yoshino undoubtedly tried to play an active role, but was never very successful. The Reimeikai and Shinjinkai influenced numerous young intellectuals who joined this or that political (often: socialist) party, but in terms of society as a whole, their influence was not very great. As mentioned above, the author joined the Shakai minshū tō in 1927, a social democratic party that merged with the Shakai taishū tō (Social Mass Party) in 1929. Initially, the party wanted primarily to be a party for the dispossessed (musan) - in the 1937 elections it won 36 MPs out of a total of 466 - but it fell apart when one of the party leaders, Akamatsu Katsumaro, a son-in-law of Yoshino, came up with Nazi ideas began to flirt and moved closer to the now increasingly militaristic establishment. Akamatsu absorbed his party in 1940 in the Taisei yokusan kai (Support Society for Imperial Rule), but lost his seat in the 1941 elections. 7 For an influential discussion, see Maruyama 1956, pp. 159 ff. 119 In short, Yoshinos were very successful political projects do not. Yet they were the result of a new belief, new ideas that had taken root in his thinking in the early 1920s, namely that democratic thinking can and must achieve its goals through social organization and political process. This inner change of Yoshino can be explained by different influences: First, his Christian faith (he converted at the age of 20), which defended the value of the individual against the generally collectively oriented ideas of his time. Second, his stay in Europe from 1910 to 1913 - a journey that he began in Germany, but which also took him to other countries, where he was able to convince himself of the socially active and to a certain extent "effective" socialism with his own eyes (so left behind a peaceful demonstration against suddenly inflated food prices in Vienna (where, according to reports, he was behind the wheel of an automobile for the first time) and a nationwide strike in Belgium in November 1912 made a lasting impression). Yoshino was able to invoke these European precedents to advocate social reforms in Japan as well. But the outbreak of the First World War thwarted his intentions. The public discourse of the great European nations took on the uniform colors light kaki and field gray, and the social democratic movement was unable to evade this warlike tendency. Yoshino said it was necessary to counterbalance the pressures of collective self-sacrifice, excessive reliance on the state, as the ultimate end - ideas that were very much alive in Japan and that were only gaining strength with new European tendencies. This counterbalance should be an appeal to the freedom of the individual.8 The relationship between the state and the individual as a central problem The first text to be discussed here is the best known and also the longest by Yoshino. The contemporary reactions to this article are difficult to assess, not least because Yoshino's arguments appear poorly structured in places. But the fact that the article appeared in one of the most widely read journals of the time shows that he obviously succeeded in getting an 8 Mitani 1997, pp. 130 ff. It is clear: The European Individualism was not dead, and it was even in this age that individualistically inspired art experienced a particular heyday. I assume that Yoshino knew about it, but decided to consciously direct the focus of his considerations to the urgent matter of political reality as well as public discourse. 120 to express certain mood that prevailed at that time among the bearers of the published opinion. What emerges as the basic tenor of his discussions is that certain circles were no longer willing to be satisfied with the authoritarian, oligarchic structures that had developed in Japan during the Meiji period (1868–1912). Yoshino dresses this basic mood in the question of whether and how a developed democracy could be compatible with the constitutional order of Japan, which is oriented towards the Tennō as the central political and spiritual authority. His answer is positive. It is not about breaking the existing political system. Most of his readers must have thought that too, because they typically belonged to a new middle class, which was gaining social and political influence in this very system.Rather, Yoshino derives a moral imperative from the Japanese constitution. He argues that it is not necessary to transfer sovereignty from the Tennō to the people as long as the government on behalf of the Tennō sees it as its main task to promote the well-being of the people. Yoshino chooses the term “people-centeredness” (minponshugi) and thereby delimits his concept from democracy, which in Japanese is literally referred to as the “principle of the people as protagonist” (minshushugi). Yoshino is convinced that concern for the Japanese people should be at the fore in all political decisions of the government and that these decisions of the political elite should not lead to alienation between the Japanese people and their representatives. In his view, these two standards apply to both monarchies and republics. For him, the essence of democracy (minshushugi) lies in the fact that the constitutional status of the people and their socio-political role coincide. In (Western) democracy, sovereignty de iure rests with the people, and at the same time it is the declared aim of the state to look after the people.9 These two levels are often mixed up in the debate in Japan because they are also in the practice of European models coincided. Yoshino points to a peculiar dynamic in the debate. According to his perception, with regard to the constitutional status of the people, there is an overwhelming fear that the people could endanger the order laid down by the constitution through usurpatory claims. But this would neglect the actually much more important question of how the government could promote the welfare of the people.10 9 Yoshino 1946, vol. 1, p. 32 ff; see also Iida 1980, p. 32. 10 Incidentally, the term minpon could be traced back to ancient Chinese texts, as one finds one in Mencius (who claimed that the prince should rule fairly and always take into account the well-being of his people). Although the same Chinese characters are used, the Japanese term cannot necessarily be associated with them. On the contrary, the 121 From the perspective of Japanese politicians, popular sovereignty could all too easily culminate in a theoretically oriented, radicalized version, according to Yoshino. Japan does not need a French revolution; that would not only be undesirable, it would be unthinkable. Yoshino expressly rejects the model of social democracy in Germany as a model for Japan. For the German social democracy is anti-monarchist, perhaps not in a radical, theoretical sense, but with regard to the practical success of its activities. Yoshino demands of the socialists in Japan that they should not work towards a revolution but should accept democracy as a form of government. This would make it conceivable that their concerns about the monarchy in Japan could also be seriously discussed among the other parties, including parties represented in parliament. However, Yoshino clearly marks the limits of such a debate. An attack on the regulation of state sovereignty (cokken) could not be tolerated under any circumstances. In Yoshino's view, such a debate would be constructive if it were aimed at choosing a suitable one from various forms of monarchy for Japan. He assesses various examples from Europe in a correspondingly differentiated manner. Weaker monarchies, such as in Italy or Austria, are characterized by a lack of stability.11 With regard to the pragmatically designed models in Belgium and Great Britain, he praises the fact that they give the monarch enough space, but criticizes the fact that in both countries there is always an in In his eyes, fruitless debate would lead to the fact that the institution of the monarchy is costing the state too much money.12 Ultimately, for Yoshino, none of the European models of monarchy are suitable as a model for Japan. He justifies this with differences in “basic attitudes” (kihonteki seishin) and with differences in social reality.13 According to Yoshino, the actual orientation of government work towards the demands and needs of the people does not contradict the sovereignty of the monarch. The constitution could be designed in terms of an acceptable exercise of power. However, the aristocratic self-confidence of the elite has a negative effect: it harms the common good if a class clings to its old privileges in the belief that it has been chosen, over the people, to become Mencius' central idea of ​​just rule and the permitted overthrow of an unjust one Ruler is never generally accepted in the intellectual tradition of Japan - not in the Edo period and certainly not after the Meiji upheaval. In a modern context ‘minponshugi’ is one of the translations of the western word ‘democracy’ - after the Meiji period, ‘minshushugi’ was used for this. 11 Yoshino 1946, vol. 1, p. 36 ff. 12 Yoshino 1946, vol. 1, p. 34 ff. 13 Yoshino 1946, vol. 1, p. 38 ff. 122 govern. The people need representatives, but their actions must be guided by the understanding that they are the "servants of the people". Modern times confronts those in power with the new challenge of facing the growing self-confidence of the people as well as the task of strengthening Japan's position in the world.14 As part of his conception of the principle of people-centeredness, Yoshino also develops an original conception of value freedom of political thought. The difference between good and undesirable democratic ideas is not always clear in the beginning, and that is precisely why, Yoshino sees it, such ideas should not be banned straight away. Japan's leaders should show the world that they do not fear reform and act with the knowledge that conflict can lead to progress. The state does not belong to a small group or class and does not only include a small part of the country, says Yoshino, and thus criticizes the formation of cliques within the “national” Meiji government, which are based on the demarcations of the old feudal system. The highest and final decision-making authority, the spiritual leadership (sō - all or none - either all translations with Kanji should be offered or none!) In the state belong only to the Tennō, but here also not to the person, but to the institution of the Tennō. Everything that benefits the Tennō also benefits the people and vice versa. Attacks on this sovereignty are not just serious as violations of applicable law, but above all because they deliberately disregard the central moral principle of the political order in Japan. The sovereignty could not be protected from such behavior by laws alone, but only through the active confession that the inviolability of the Tennō lineage is an expression of a centuries-old social consensus. Yoshino states that "loyalty to the prince (= the emperor) is the essence of our national life (kokutai no seika) and the spirit of the foundation of our country." 15 Such loyalty should not be misunderstood as a demand for absolute submission, Nor does it legitimize the fact that the ruler may disregard the welfare of the people. Basically, Yoshino is designing the model of a morally limited monarchy. In his opinion, however, the current disputes over the form of government in Japan revolve around a completely different problem. Because the Japanese people and their leaders lack sufficient knowledge of democratic procedures, socialists would be left too much leeway for agitation. This leads to a radicalization towards a radical socialism that vehemently rejects the existing structures and mobilizes the masses to resist it. 14 Mitani 1972, Meicho p. 126 ff. 15 Yoshino 1946, vol. 1, p.87 ff. 123. This would cause the ruling class to act too authoritarian against these political opponents, assuming that there are no other options. This applies to experienced politicians of the old upper class as well as to the new class of aspiring politicians who, thanks to their personal wealth, have gained influence within the parliamentary system. In Yoshino's eyes, however, these disputes are wrong insofar as they involve the monarchy in a polarized verbal dispute and the central question for him about a form of a spiritually unrestricted monarchy that is appropriate to the general well-being does not play a role for Japan. With these "reflections on the nature of a policy in the spirit of the constitution [...]", Yoshino draws an interim balance sheet, as it were, in the development of his political thought. At a young age, Yoshino was more nationalistic. He hailed the war against Russia in 1904-1905 and the subsequent Japanese victory as "the foundation of world peace" and a stage for "the true nature of the Japanese spirit". At that time he defined the state as “the unity of a people in one country” and emphasized that he could not live for a day without the state, precisely because for him state and society were one.16 In this phase of his work Yoshinos became Thinking influenced by his professor at Tokyo University, Hozumi Nobushige. Nobushige was the older brother of the better-known law professor Hozumi Yatsuka, who would later become famous as a conservative and national-mythical-oriented opponent of the liberal constitutional lawyer Minobe Tatsukichi. Hozumi Nobushige introduced Yoshino to a doctrine of the state that was strongly oriented towards a certain reception of Hegel's thought. A distant echo of Hegel's idea of ​​the workings of an objective will in the course of human history can be heard when Yoshino states in the text “What is the state soul?” (Kokka tamashii to wa nani zo ya), written in February 1905, that “every The individual is ceaselessly controlled and guided by the will of the group to which it belongs. ”17 Hegelian ideas are also echoed in later works. On the one hand, Yoshino increasingly uses the category of social class in his argument, but at the same time he sticks to the view that the state represents an organism and at the same time the “highest norm” (kihan). 16 Quoted from Iida 1980, p. 9 ff. 17 Iida 1980, p. 10. Also: Yoshino Sakuzō Senshū, Vol. 1 (Politics and State), pp.78-81. 124 Yoshino subordinated his interest in democratic ideas to this understanding of the state until around 1920. However, democratic elements can be found in his texts even before this time, while conversely, arguments for a collective can also be found after 1920. As early as 1904, he points out that individual legal interests are indispensable, and describes the state as “a collective whose strength is based on the self-realization of the individual”. And on the other hand, even in the years after 1920, he described a stable state order as an important prerequisite for the success of democracy.18 The question of the relationship between “state centrism” and “individual centrism” came up again and again during these years. For example, he wrote in a text from 1918: “A nation organized in a state is more than the mechanical assembly of a few individuals. An individual existence outside the state is unthinkable at all. That is why we naturally seek our present social ideals in the harmony of state structures with individual freedom. There we find our political ideals, namely in the attempt to visualize these principles, whereby we are guided by the endeavor to further develop the state structures and at the same time promote the healthy development of individuals. ”19 Here, too, Yoshino emphasizes the blossoming of individual freedom, and, What is even more important, he tries to enhance this precisely by presenting it as the basis for the prosperity of the state: "We should see that the prevalence of state centrism is casting a great shadow on our country, and it is my wish to ( Well understood, JJ) state thinking by evaluating positively the blossoming of the idea of ​​the individual. ”20 It is no coincidence that these utterances sound“ dialectical ”, so to speak, in the sense that there is a direct connection between historical and spiritual developments is tried and the dynamic of “thesis-antithesis-synthesis” can be felt. During his career as a thinker, Yoshino was inspired by a historicized, almost pantheistic optimism in the style of Hegel, who assumes that at the end of all things, reason (as a democratic arrangement) will prevail.21 This is another reason why he often refers to “the tendency of World ”(jisei), on those ideas that are prevalent today. The all too simple individualism of the early 19th century, which was very popular in Japan in the 1880s, was found in 18 Vgl Iida, op. 19 Yoshino Sakuzô hakase minshushugi ronshū, Vol. 1, p. 253. 20 Ibid., P. 170. 21 Mitani 1997, pp. 127-143; Iida 1980, pp. 16-17. 125 no mercy in his eyes. The European ideas of the late 19th century, which recognized the state as a result of history and at the same time the individual as a being deeply rooted in society, but also longing for freedom, interested him much more. This is also the idea on which his “people-centeredness” (minponshugi) is based: “One should grant the right to political participation, but at the same time strengthen and stimulate the idea of ​​responsibility ... Promote state spirit (kokka no seishin) and, by making all people aware of their tasks in the state, also contribute to the flourishing of the state. ”22 Elsewhere, Yoshino points out the need to curb idealistic individualism with“ the intellectual rod ” , or writes of “thinking of state centrism as the idea of ​​a communal group.” 23 A turning point in Yoshino's thinking Around 1920, Yoshino made a fundamental turn in his political thinking. Henceforth he rejected the claim that only the state and the state alone stand for "the common life of the nation". In Yoshino's thinking, the state mutates into a power that controls our lives by means of coercion and orders. In a departure from Hegel's ideas, Yoshino separates the idea of ​​a “community group”, which is an indispensable framework for the life of every individual, from the idea of ​​the state. The state is no longer seen by him as the “organic totality of the people” and the supreme regulatory authority. Instead, Yoshino now emphasizes the concept of "society" (shakai) as the fundamental community of human life. The state thus becomes an institution of rule, of government, but above all a part of society.24 The years around 1920 were a very turbulent period in the history of Japan in the Taishō period (1912-1925). It was at that time that the loss of power of the traditional “cliques” (hanbatsu) became irreversible and many came from the class of the “nouveaux riches”, supported by an economy that flourished until 1919 (special needs of the war, elimination of European competitors in Asia) , worked up to politicians. Against this background, Yoshino pleaded for more political parties. 22 Yoshino 1946, vol. 1, p. 264 ff. 23 Iida 1980, p. 20. 24 Iida 1980, p. 41 ff. This idea is elaborated by Iida in a detailed way. 126 zipation, specifically for “healthy party politics” and for universal suffrage. In 1919, under the leadership of Hara Takashi (also: Hara Kei), the first cabinet was founded that was controlled by the political parties instead of the army or the so-called "patriarchs" (genrō). The right to vote was exercised in 1925 and the first elections were held in 1928. In this political situation, Yoshino turned his attention to the institutions and factors that, in his opinion, made it difficult for a functioning democracy to come about. These included the "Senate" (literally: Council of the Elderly Wise Men, genrō'in), the Secret State Council (sūmitsu'in), the upper house (kizoku'in), which is not mentioned as an official authority in the constitution, but is very influential. and last but not least, the army's political influence. It is noticeable in this context that Yoshino made concrete proposals for reforms that gave his sharp criticism a pragmatic character. His refusal to advocate radical measures or to recognize them as a viable option may have something to do with his distrust of the socialists: Although it later became clear that there had been no such concrete plans, the Japanese public was still caught up in the so-called “treason affair ”(Taigyaku jiken) from 1911 - an alleged plot by these“ radical activists ”to assassinate the highest authority, the Tennō himself. There was no agreement among the Japanese public for actions of this kind, and Yoshino also strictly opposed any acts of violence. He did this for a completely different reason: because of his Christian faith. Ultimately, Yoshino's understanding of Christian or, more generally, spiritual and spiritual values ​​was incompatible with the materialism of a Marxist-inspired socialism or with the radicalism of the anarcho-syndicalists who were trying to establish themselves in Japan at the time. On the other hand, Yoshino was downright astonished by the pacifism of the socialists, which included progressive-liberal thinkers like Kinoshita Naoe. The early Yoshino hesitated to identify with a way of thinking that positioned itself so clearly outside the establishment and thus beyond national loyalty. His Christian faith did not cause him any worries in this context, because with a few exceptions the Japanese churches had already submitted to the state ideology symbolized by the Tennō. Yoshino, however, remained optimistic about the possibilities of modifying the imperial system from within. In his view, a fundamental overthrow was not necessary. This is the quintessence of his texts from 1916, which he later developed further and which consisted in the fact that every system has a material and a spiritual side and that the success or failure of every structural reform depends on psychological factors. For example, Mexico and the United States are both democracies, but the Mexicans lack the spiritual strength that puritanism produces in the United States. Each individual should therefore put his motives in the service of the state, the common good and in this way realize a “great spiritual unity of the people” (dai minzoku seishin ).25 This idea of ​​the public good, which Yoshino equates with the “people's spirit”, follows the core idea of ​​sovereignty. It finds its meaning in the “sovereign” (shukensha), the concrete bearer of national fate. He is the barely visible, barely nameable, but ubiquitous morality within the boundaries of the Japanese empire, the highest authority. There are countries in which the parliament embodies the highest authority, but in Japan it is the Tennō. In this assertion, Yoshino agrees with the intellectual and political mainstream of his time. Nevertheless, an ambivalence is visible here. On the one hand, he does not succeed in transgressing the Rubicon of kokutai thought (the emphasis on “national essence”), not even in his later works. On the other hand, it appears that Yoshino is subordinating the monarch to the salvation of the state. This should rule for the sake of the common good, on the basis of the state foundation, namely the constitutional order. But this order was not merely legal: the “consensus” imposed by the Meiji leaders - “the people serve (the imperial fatherland)” - which was to last until 1945, did not allow the concept of sovereignty to be viewed as “state compulsion” ( kokka iryoku) to objectify. Yoshino got caught in a crossfire between the positions of the right (for which the tennō should never be an instrument, although the imperial authority was sometimes used as a political weapon by these very people) and the left. Yoshino did not deny that the constitution, from which all other laws emerge, is in the hands of the Tennō as the supreme authority. In the actual process of political life, however, Yoshino felt that political violence was more important because it could lead to better governance. Die 25 Yoshino 1946, vol. 1, p. 6 ff. In view of the fact that Yoshino spent some time in Heidelberg shortly before the First World War, it may seem plausible that Yoshino's respect for the legacy of Puritanism on the influence of Max Weber to lead back, but at least in Yoshino's texts themselves there is not the slightest mention or reference to it. 128 The legitimacy of this violence is of course based on the imperial authority. Incidentally, in public discourse the emperor was not a “guardian of the constitution”, was not a strict, but a just and neutral ruler. The constitution, in turn, was a gift from the emperor to his people and embodied something uniquely valuable and uniquely good. Yoshino tried to fit this "intellectual" view into a democratic framework - even in the history of Japan. According to the author, the recognition of the legitimacy of this violence has developed historically: from a judgment of a few to a judgment of many, i.e. from aristocratic arbitrariness to a democratic constitution. Today it is a fact that a large number of people decide on the basis of assessment of national (state) politics.26 This presupposes that the people actively demand their role, their share in this political power, that they exercise their will a modern system, without destroying the foundations or questioning the core of the state - because sovereignty lies with the state and thus with the monarch.27 Yoshino was criticized for making his assessment of the state too "essentialist" is, in some cases even incomprehensible, and that in his interpretation the participation of the people remains only a single aspect in the context of an all-encompassing state ideology clad in religious terms.28 After his stay in Europe shortly before the First World War, Yoshino's optimism is shaken and it appears to no longer be evident to him, a merging of the general Volkswil lens to be conceived with the reason of state. However, it was only after 1920 that there were really significant changes in Yoshino's idea of ​​the state, in the course of which its democratic potential was fully developed. Another aspect of Yoshino's work was his criticism that the so-called "western civilization" (bunmei) created a wide gap between rich and poor, rather than preventing an unequal distribution of wealth. One of his most important projects during this time (December 1918) was the founding of two political associations: the “Society of the New Man” (Shinjinkai) and the “Society of the Dawn” (Reimeikai). Its aim was to bridge the gap between those who took advantage of wartime economic growth and the poor majority of the population. 27 Even today there are right-wing historians such as Ishida and Nishibe who praise Yoshino's “sagacity” in not entrusting sovereignty to the people, specifically to their representatives, the politicians. See Ishida 2006, pp. 81-93. 28 Iida 1980, pp. 36-41. 129 to dissolve. The emerging course of events, i.e. the emergence of a mass democracy, made it clear that one could no longer assume that the will of the people and the reasons of state would complement each other in a more or less natural way. Founded in 1918, Reimeikai, an association that advocated free discussion and debate, aimed both at an academic discourse on the Japanese “national essence” (kokutai) and the development of Japan within the civilized world. She also pursued the enlightenment of the masses, whom she saw seduced by worldly ideas. The direct reason for its establishment was a public debate (which allegedly followed 1,500 people), in which the right-wing radical Rōninkai took part alongside Yoshino's new club. The "Association of the Leader" (Rōninkai) was founded in 1908 by radical nationalist activists. Its members did not hesitate to torpedo the increasingly democratic political process with assassinations and other acts of violence. Not only some politicians, but also freedom of expression itself suffered great damage. Although the Rōninkai preferred not to appear in public, this time they agreed to participate. She was sharply attacked by Yoshino in his article for the magazine Chūō kōron from November 1918. She probably hoped that a confrontation with a well-known professor would increase her popularity (even if she didn't mean that in a democratic sense). Yoshino emerged victorious from this debate. But due to a number of minor and major difficulties, the Reimeikai was not given a long life: it fell apart in 1920. The Shinjinkai, founded in the same year, however, managed to mobilize a broader base. However, a little later she joined the socialist movement, which expanded rapidly after 1919, and was finally absorbed by the Communist Party.29 Yoshino, who refused to believe that politics was nothing more than a gimmick of the capitalist class, hardly turned this into a brilliant achievement have seen. Overall, it can be said that Yoshino more and more sympathized with left-wing political ideas during these years. There have been a multitude of socio-political incidents that may have influenced Yoshino in this regard: In 1918 the "rice riots" broke out in Japan, which demonstrated that the energy of the people should not be underestimated, 30 and as early as 1917 on the October revolu- 29 Nihonshi jiten 1990, pp. 525-526, 1034. Cf. also Smith 1972. 30 High rice prices formed the occasion for these protests. First in Toyama, then across the country, protesters stormed rice camps, the homes of wealthy merchants and many shops. The riots ended - roughly outlined - after the severe persecution and punishment of many hundreds of “troublemakers” and, on the other hand, with the resignation of Prime Minister Terauchi. A new government 130 tion in Russia. With it, a stream of new ideas, such as Kropotkin's anarchism or the thoughts of Bertrand Russell, which was interpreted as "anarchist", poured into Japan. During the notorious Morito case (1920) 31, Yoshino experienced first hand how easily free expression could be suppressed. Yoshino appeared as a witness against the scholar Morito, and it can be assumed that in the course of the hearing it became clear to him that the Japanese state was ready to use the instruments at its disposal to promote freedom of the press, one of the basic principles of Yoshino's "folk-centeredness" (minponshugi) to limit. This made it more difficult for him to continue to defend his original ideas about the symbiotic relationship between “state” and “individual.” 32 At this point, Yoshino tried to make it clear that there was an essential difference between criticizing states in theirs present-day form and criticism of every form of social life. This is where a turning point in Yoshino's thinking takes place - not yet giving up the old ideals, but a partial departure from them: the state forms the framework within which the individual can and should develop, but there is a sharp division between society as the fundamental form of real, communal life and the sub-area of ​​politics. Yoshino, however, did not give up hope that the state could potentially be an efficient aid - beneficial to the common good, beneficial to the prosperity of the people. He wanted to give the Japanese people a new pattern of behavior - one that shows that mutual help is part of human instinct and that an association of individuals in groups based not on control by coercion but on the free will of the individual , is not an unattainable ideal. Yoshino viewed the exercise of power as a means to a higher end, and thus not an evil per se. Yoshino also sympathized with the neo-Kantian thinking that found its way to Japan at the time, especially with humanism and the respect for transcendent values ​​in connection with politics. Yoshino did not go so far as to be clear on how this new policy could be implemented, but he undoubtedly played a unique role, researching, this time under the direction of Hara Kei, Japan's first “Chancellor of the Common People” (heimin saishô). 31 Morito Tatsuo (1888-1984) was a professor who incurred the wrath of right-wing extremists with a contribution on Kropotkin's anarcho-syndicalism and had to give up his professorship. A lawsuit ensued and many of his colleagues tried to help Morito - including Yoshino - but to no avail. 32 Iida 1980, pp. 45-46. 131 which he continually referred to the permanent tension between the two elements man and society, or individual and state. The Essays of 1919 and 1923 One of the essays that discusses this in detail is "Kokka chūshinshugi to kojin chūshin-shugi - ni shichō no tairitsu, shōtotsu, chōwa" (1919). The theme, freely interpreted, is: “Where is Japan's future going? Should we continue to emphasize the concerns of the state and the state alone, or should there be more room for the claims of the individual? " It deals with the tendency of contemporary conservative discourse to attribute the political problems of Europe, the outbreak of the First World War and its development to the "egoism" widespread in Western societies. Yoshino was of the opinion that many publicists and journalists in Japan were excessively inclined to "state centrism" and that it would do no harm to counteract this basic mood: "I have nothing against discourses or procedures that make the state the standard, but I believe there is a dark shadow over the 'state centrism' that is so popular in our country today. It is my wish to correct the excessive emphasis on the state by paying greater attention to the individual. Which values ​​do they consider important, how should we imagine the relationship between the two and, in this context, the political fortunes of our country? ”33 Yoshino describes the state as an organic unit consisting of a collection of individual individuals - people who have a have a special, common feature, 34 through which they can be identified as a united people. As in any organic whole, there is a symbiotic relationship between the whole and its parts. Nevertheless, the whole thing can never function without its individual components. Obviously, in a developed and therefore entangled organic totality, certain components would have to be sacrificed in favor of the whole. In order to strengthen the state, for example, armaments spending would have to be increased. But this must not be done in such a way that the citizens suffer unreasonable privations as a result. In addition, in order to guarantee freedom of expression, even the most extreme opinions must be tolerated. But this could weaken the state unity 33 Yoshino 1946, vol. 1, p.170. 34 From the discussions of Yoshino it cannot simply be inferred which characteristics are meant: Yoshino presumably meant that characteristic which is relevant for a specific group or the state - language, belief, flag, etc. 132 result. Yoshino argues that a reconciliation of interests is the only thing we can reasonably hope for, and writes: “Bismarck was without a doubt the master of state centrism in modern history, but although he spent vast sums on armament expansion, he did not fail to find one to implement a well-engineered social plan in a great way and to focus on the happiness of the individual, especially with regard to the working class. ”35 Few politicians are able to enforce such a policy so consistently. In Yoshino's words it sounds like this: For a long time the option of individualism was little more than a theoretical question in human history, but since the 19th century the principles of individualism have gradually become a reality. It is now clear that the well-being of the people can no longer depend on a small, elitist layer. On the other hand, there are few people who have the interest and intellectual abilities to participate in the creation of people's welfare. The elite, in turn, have always opposed this assessment that the welfare of the people is at stake.The resistance of the elite (or the elites) was shown by the fact that they put their own interests in the foreground at all costs with reference to state concerns, which had happened at the expense of the freedoms of the people. There will never be a perfect balance, but as long as you give both forces the opportunity to compete with each other, you can rely on a secure future. To do this, however, politicians would have to show the willingness to want to watch over the greatest good of a civilized state, namely freedom of expression and speech.36 The 19th century brought about a protracted struggle between the two tendencies, in which neither side supported the Got the upper hand. The individualistic discourses had never become so influential that they put the entire system and the class that clung to state thought in real danger. Even today (ie while Yoshino is writing this, JJ) there are strong states in Europe, and a violent counter-movement has even developed against extreme egalitarianism, the best-known representative of which is Friedrich Nietzsche.37 It would be unnecessary and even harmful to avoid any kind of commitment to renounce the state and to portray any limitation of individual freedoms as oppression. Yoshino now assumes that especially in smaller countries like Japan the 35 Yoshino 1946, vol, 1, p.173-4. 36 Ibid. P. 179, cf. also vol. 3, p. 237 ff. 37 Ibid. S. 183. 133 political unity is necessary in order to assert oneself against the international community of states. The constitution means the consent of the ruling class, but the impetus for the constitution comes from the people and shows that there is a general urge for freedom. There is also an urge for social equality and equality (which also applies to the population of the colonies or the women in a given population). Furthermore, the claims of socialism - understood here as economic integrity - must also be taken into account.38 Yoshino believes that Hegel, too, states that the state cannot be the basis of every individual activity or consideration. In the arts, in religion, etc., the state is nothing more than a means to an end. In this sense, Yoshino took the view that the state was only a means to individual salvation, and thus represented an instrumentalist way of thinking that found approval in his time, especially in socially critical circles. But in Yoshino's view, even Fichte defined the state as an institution for the protection of the three basic human rights - the freedom of the individual, the protection of property, and the preservation of physical integrity.39 With his admiration for the German model (in Yoshino's age: the empire) did not return: Germany organized the social forces within the state in an efficient way and thereby gained the respect of many Japanese, although it was the "enemy" in the context of the First World War. Yoshino warns the "state-centrists," or more precisely, the proponents of state-centrism, against exaggeration and radicalism. The unreasonable idea for this unreasonable idea that there is no moral norm that exceeds that of the state is an idea that undermines the credibility of the state itself. He ends his remarks with a plea for a fairer approach to the upbringing and education of the citizens and in politics, where, among other things, he is against a ban on demonstrations.40 Yoshino's assessment of the question of the Japanese colonies cannot be discussed here in greater detail. One point that Yoshino emphasizes consistently is his attitude towards the army. He does not reject the need for a strong army, claiming that no “individualist” can deny it, but the question of how military force should be exercised should not be left to the military cliques (and the militarist groups) alone. Pp. 191-193. 39 Yoshino 1946, Vol. 1, pp. 194 ff. 40 For a more detailed discussion, see Yoshino's 1914 essay in “On Demonstrations of the People” (Minshûteki shii undô o ronzu). In: Mitani, Meicho, pp. 65-91. 134 to be answered. The army is too authoritarian an institution, and there is an “authoritarian militarism” in Japan, which ignores all individual concerns and feelings inside and outside the army. The most shameless and egregious behavior Yoshino makes in connection with the practice of the medical examiner. Not infrequently they can be seen in town halls in rural areas, where they show such arrogance as if they alone were the honorable representatives of state power. The army must try to win the hearts of the people. But in this respect Japan only adopted the outward form and not the actual content of the German model.41 A clear criticism of the arrogant attitude of the army can be found in his essay “I'aku jōsō ron” (considerations on the 'direct appeal to the imperial authority ', 1923). This text provides an analysis related to the political practice of the Taishō period and particularly goes into how Articles 11, 12 and 55 of the still applicable Meiji Constitution should be interpreted against the background of the more democratic and liberal Taishō period. Yoshino assumed that it was dangerous to give the military all important decisions relating to war and peace, the armaments budget - military spending had been exorbitantly increased as a result of the war against Russia in 1904/05 - and international diplomatic efforts to demilitarize (for example, the reduction of the the number of battleships). The Japanese military justified their claims to power with Articles 11 and 12 of the Constitution, which give the emperor and his army supreme command without parliament being able to object. Opponents of this interpretation, who, like Yoshino, were, as it were, opponents of the power of the Japanese Minister of War, argued that the Imperial Supreme Command should only be effective in times of war. In peacetime, reference should be made to Article 55, which stipulated that cabinet ministers should be responsible for all political decisions.42 Yoshino suggested two solutions to correct this evil. First, Japanese citizens need to be more aware of the need for active participation, and second, various bodies need to be reformed. For this Yoshino counted above all the habitual change of professional officers into politics, as well as the subordination of the people, which interprets every military order, wherever it comes from, as an irrefutable order of the emperor. 41 Yoshino 1946, Vol. 1, pp. 213 ff. 42 Mitani 1972, pp. 186, 192, etc. 135 Final Considerations Yoshino's ideas of the relationship between the state and the individual did not always fit into a stringent line of argument. In the course of his life he developed the idea of ​​the state as the basic order for every individual life into a concept in which the state should serve as an apparatus, as a mechanism for the self-realization of the people. It should be adjusted and optimized by politicians, intellectuals and the people in order to be able to take on this function effectively and constructively. His vision of his own form of morally restricted monarchy for Japan, however, could hardly develop its potential during his lifetime. It was overshadowed and absorbed too much in the course of the 1920s and even more in the course of the 1930s by another debate, namely the debate about the nature of the Japanese state (kokutai), which conservative circles in the political elite led to a struggle for survival against the Presumptions of Western concepts of individualism, but also of revolution and socialism, was hyped up. Yoshino himself was not immune from including mystical ideas similar to those formulated by these conservatives in his argumentation. So he used modern, social democratic-oriented ideas to create a national unity - a national unity around the "ten thousand year old tradition", a spiritual harmony among the Japanese, which is above the law and therefore apolitical in nature. What was new in Yoshino's thinking, however, was not the definition of a new principle - the unique primacy of Imperial Authority was an old idea - or its elaboration into a variety of political practices. In this respect there is still a certain elitism in his proposals. What set Yoshino apart as a progressive and innovative thinker in his age was his unwavering belief in the feasibility of democracy. This should not be a threat to the imperial order; on the contrary, democracy could only make Japan more united and stronger. Disagreement, demonstrations, socialist ideas - he saw all of these as surmountable and even necessary manifestations of strife, which he far preferred to the machinations of an unaccountable elite. The further development of Japanese domestic and foreign policy during the twelve years after Yoshino's death in 1933 made it clear that his criticism of the dominant role of the army and his critical positions on the Japanese attitude towards neighboring countries Korea (which had been annexed since 1910) and China was unable to cope with the cheer patriotism of the military and nationalists, as well as the opportunism or weakness of the elite, not to mention the (partly self-responsible?) Ignorance of the “common people”. Yoshino's ideas were sharp enough to expose some of the system's essential weaknesses, but did not have sufficient “penetrative power” to destroy the existing order or - perhaps too high a claim! - to change the tragically ending course of his country in good time. There was a bitter irony in this course: neglecting his criticism and suppressing all freedom of thought in the name of the emperor had dire consequences for millions in Asia and the Pacific, and ultimately deposed not only the Japanese people and the state, but even the emperor even unprecedented dangers. The implementation of the idea that imperial tradition was compatible with democracy was undoubtedly one of the profound and essential changes in post-war Japan. Yoshino's legacy was a factor that enabled the liberals of this era, when liberalism was not yet dominated by conservatism, to reject a particular criticism: the criticism that the post-war reforms were nothing more than American imports, like it chocolate and nylon stockings were. Yoshino was thus a "precedent" that allowed a defeated generation to find new hope. Literature Hayashi, Shigeru, 1961. 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Kuno, Osamu & Tsurumi, Shunsuke (eds.), 1956: Gendai Nihon no shisō (Modern Thinking in Japan) 1956 (35th edition 1994). Tokyo: Iwanami shooting. 137 Maruyama, Masao, 1956: Sensō sekinin no bōten (The Emphasis on War Responsibility), in: Maruyama Masao Shū (Works by Maruyama Masao) (1996). Tokyo: Iwanami shooting. Volume 4, pp. 159-165. Matsumoto, Sannosuke, 2008: Yoshino Sakuzō. Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai. Matsuo, Takayoshi, 1998: Minponshugi to teikokushugi (Democracy and Imperialism) .. Tokyo: Misuzu shobō Mitani, Taichirō, 1997: Taishō demokurashii ron - Yoshino Sakuzō no jidai (Democracy in the Taishō period - The age of Yoshino Sakuzōs). Tokyo: Tokyo saigaku shuppankai. 2nd edition. Mitani, Taichirō (ed.), 1972. Nihon no meicho 48: Yoshino Sakuzō (Japanese classic 48: Yoshino Sakuzō). Tokyo: Chūō kōron sha. Najita, Tetsuo, 1974: Some Reflections on Idealism in the Political Thought of Yoshino Sakuzō. In: Silberman & Harootunian (Eds.) 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Tokyo: Iwanami shooting. 138 Chŏn, Chae-ho The State Theory of Cho So-ang: The Principle of the Three Equality Cho So-ang is a representative theorist from the ranks of the national independence movement, which in the first half of the 20th century during the Japanese colonial period in China worked. He advocated the point of view that it was necessary for the independence movement to succeed in eliminating the ideological contradictions between left and right, and in the course of this process created an “independent” theory: the principle of three equality (samgyun chuŭi). This theory aims at the equality of people, nations and states and includes considerations on the new form of government and the favored international relations after independence. The principle of three equals emerged as the guiding principle of the Independence Party of Korea, which was founded in January 1930, and was then elevated to the common doctrine of the camp of Korean independence fighters active in China, including the Korean National People's Party (Han'guk kungmin-dang) and the national revolutionaries Party (Minjok hyŏngmyŏng-dang). After the liberation, it was also reflected in the constitution of the Republic of Korea. An examination of Cho So-ang's principle of the three equations thus helps to understand the conception of the state developed in the end times of colonial rule and in the early period after the liberation in Korea. Cho's concept allows us to find out which society, which state, the Korean society at that time was striving for, how the perceptions about the state developed and which peculiarities they exhibited. If one also takes into account that Cho developed his own ideology after systematically acquiring traditional East Asian and modern Western knowledge and reading a lot about Confucianism, Christianity, the Taejonggyo religion as well as capitalism, anarchism, socialism and other ideological and religious directions, this can Principle of the three parallels can be assessed as a characteristic state doctrine, which reflects the historical context of Korea in the first half of the 20th century. As is known, due to internal reasons, Korea could not transform itself from a monarchy into a modern state. At the end of the 19th century, Korea became part of Japan